By Kerry Abbott

As Cypriot leaders undertake another round of consultations, at an expanded roundtable in New York under UN auspices, indications abound that there is a limit to what negotiations achieve. The general idea prevails that parties back at the table, meeting face to face, is a good sign. However, convening a meeting as a gesture of productive action poses a risk. Holding talks when there is no reason to think they will end differently than past rounds may instead be destructive, by undermining public morale. Ultimately, further efforts can be seen as a waste of time, futile.

It is critical that the aim not be resumption of negotiations, but achieving an agreement. And yet, President Christodoulides said in May, “The positive developments aim at one goal, and one goal only: the resumption of negotiations. This is our goal. “Negotiating what? Crossing points? As Turkish Cypriot delegate Mine Atli noted, the issues discussed by the Cypriot leaders in recent meetings in Geneva were matters for technical committees to resolve.

How many rounds of talks need to end in failure before the very idea of negotiations becomes discredited?  Already, the political aim – a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution –has been abandoned as the official position of the North because of past failures. That could change, but it will not alleviate Turkish Cypriot resentment that Greek Cypriots have the ability to rebuff their offers of co-existence.

If talks are discredited, what else is there to do–unless one realizes that change is not made through talks but through strategic prioritization of relevant action. Successful talks confirm changes made elsewhere.

The UN lacks leverage – the incentives and pressures that make options clear to parties in conflict – making its role quite passive. UN talks in Yemen, Libya, and Syria failed to alter the situation on the ground, while local initiatives have achieved more – such as the release of prisoners and the opening of roads in Yemen and the change of government in Syria.

It is those changes away from the negotiating table that lead to a desire to compromise which is confirmed in an agreement. Are other parties at the talks prepared to use their influence in substantive ways? Can additional powers provide linkage with other regional initiatives?

Cypriots made clear in a series of interviews last year, on the anniversary of the Turkish invasion, that they did not feel there was anything they could do to bring about an agreement. Some felt they had been manipulated by their leaders. Young people were generally directionless and passive bystanders. Many felt that great powers would decide the outcome, not strategic actions by Cypriots themselves. You do not need to like or understand each other or agree with each other or interact in order to craft an agreement that serves your interests. Greek Cypriots can be suspicious, mistrust, dislike but still make concessions for a deal, in part because the alternative is worse. One does what is necessary to secure the future.

So, can the discussions in New York involving guarantor powers provide leverage to make a return to the positions of the Crans Montana process acceptable? And would Greek Cypriots today accept those terms of agreement, that they rejected eight years ago when still under the sway of Russian influence instead of entrenched in the West and EU orbit?

There is no reason to think repeating the same formula will lead to a more optimal outcome. An analysis of past failures must occur in the interim to address systemic weaknesses.  Why hold a referendum when you know the outcome will be rejection? Why allow talks to be held by parties with vested interests in the status quo instead of weighted by the perspectives of others with interests in resolution?

Who conducts the analysis of constituents on each side and how they can support a peace process and not just talks. A peace process should not be left in the hands of politicians but in the reach of the people who can describe how terms of the agreement can be of benefit.

How much is it worth to regain Varosha? Or Morphou? Or to have the peace of mind that comes with partial resolution of issues dividing the island? What business leaders can work together to make clear how a united Cyprus can prosper the island and its international profile straddling two continents?

Most important, the failed talks and isolation that led some Turkish Cypriots to call for independence, along with the wave of political repression in Turkey, and the current regional divisions suggest that the status quo will not last. The relative satisfaction Greek Cypriots have today will dissipate in coming years into awkward divisions with the North on many international issues.

Ironically, both Turkey and Cyprus have offered to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How better to develop credentials in conflict resolution that by demonstrating your resourcefulness and resolving your own divisions first.

Functional conflict resolution needs to occur that alters the reality on the ground and the expectations of key constituencies so that talks mainly confirm what has been crafted and agreed elsewhere. Otherwise, the result is a negotiated agreement that has gaps that fail to address the practical issues affecting interested parties. Bi-communal business partners. common concerns between professionals, similar problems in governance structures and service provision – all of these outline paths of cooperation. But no one – not the UN or EU – has assumed the role of identifying the obstacles, the inhibitions, the insecurities that should be converted into a force for a settlement. Each leader values the control he now has, but it comes at the cost of a greater country and international role.

Imagine how things could change for the worse. Soon Cypriots will see their island divided not just by language, religion, and culture but also by type of government and even alliances, when Turkey dictates the foreign policy in the North and takes it into the sphere of influence of Russia and Iran, not the West.

Before Cyprus tries to be the regional peacemaker, it has to show flexibility in accommodating present reality. The region is in a fluid state with many opportunities. For Cypriots, as a new path to an agreement struggles to emerge, the process of self-determination begins, with a willingness to take the responsibility for one’s destiny and act.

Kerry Abbott evaluates interventions in 23 conflict regions, as a strategist and mediator