A major disagreement surfaced at the House on Wednesday when Justice Minister Marios Hartsiotis, presented the provisions of the bills for the reform of the Legal Service. The reform would end the dual role of the attorney-general as legal advisor of the state and public prosecutor.  It would pave the way for the creation of a director of public prosecutions, independent of the Legal Service and the attorney-general.

Attorney-General George Savvides expressed strong reservations about the constitutionality of bills at the meeting also citing the bi-communality of the constitution as well as the law of necessity. As AG and custodian of the rule of law, Savvides said he had a duty “to point out the visible constitutional dangers that could possibly emerge in the event that the proposed bills were voted, with huge, insurmountable, negative consequences in the case of a successful challenge of their constitutionality.”

Savvides’ fear, explained after the meeting, was that if there was an appeal against the new laws and the supreme constitutional court upheld the appeal the changes would be null and void. He also warned that this could “open the way for the “amendment/transformation of the basic structure of the Constitution of 1960.”

This argument about the Constitution of 1960, is wearing a bit thin, considering its basis – bi-communality – existed only for three years. From 1964 to today – that is, for 61 years – bi-communality is an abstract notion of no practical import, usually cited as an argument against the amendment of the constitution. Why we are safeguarding the bicommunal structure of the constitution when bi-communality does not exist in the Republic, and using this as an obstacle to modernization, only a lawyer or judge could explain.

Why, for instance, is a Greek Cypriot in the post of deputy attorney-general, when the constitution stipulates that a Turkish Cypriot should have this post? The Cyprus Republic lost its bi-communal nature/structure in 1964 so why is the theatre continuing 60 years later and much needed reforms are shelved because of alleged unconstitutionality?

In the case of the powers of the AG, if there is a danger that changing them could be ruled unconstitutional, why do we not amend the constitution. All the political parties support the ending of the dual role of the AG, so the two thirds majority necessary for constitutional change is certain to be achieved, thus ensuring that no appeal against the new state of affairs could be successful. Unless we cannot amend the constitution without the Turkish Cypriot vote.

A ‘committee of experts’ made up of lawyers and former judges were divided about the constitutionality of the proposed reforms. Three lawyers said these were constitutional, two had reservations and two ex-judges believed they were unconstitutional. The irony was that the proposed reforms were prepared by the justice ministry, without consultation with the legal advisor of the state – AG Savvides. Perhaps this explains the deep disagreement between government and its legal advisor, witnessed at the House on Wednesday.

It remains to be seen what the parties will decide, but while they are at it, they should discuss the more general issue – why are most attempts to modernize the operation of the state deemed unconstitutional. Do constitutions exist to prevent change?