After Erhurman’s victory, ball is in Christodoulides’ court

Federalism is back on the agenda after the election of Tufan Erhurman as “TRNC president” by a landslide comparable to the resounding approval Turkish Cypriots gave the UN-EU sponsored bicommunal bizonal federation (BBF) plan in the 2004 referendum.

BBF was the main platform on which Erhurman fought the election and his democratic mandate coupled with his legal and political expertise and experience make him the best qualified leader the Turkish Cypriots have ever had to address the complexities of the Cyprus problem.

Cyprus is now on a settlement path after five barren years wasted on separatist independence that, like union with Greece, was as unachievable as it was in breach of treaty law. The international status of Republic of Cyprus (RoC) as an independent state with a single sovereignty is guaranteed by both Turkey and Greece, which is why a federation that preserves a single sovereignty is so uniquely suitable for Cyprus.

Federalism has many variants depending on geography, history, language, religion, politics and geopolitics. Its purpose in the context of Cyprus is to unite two diverse communities while at the same time preserving their autonomy. 

Cyprus is a small island in a volatile region in the East Mediterranean close to Turkey to the north, Syria, Lebanon and Israel to the east and Egypt and the Suez canal to the south.

As a small island it was acquired many times by powerful empires that dominated the region. The last was the British Empire which acquired control of Cyprus in 1878 and granted it independence in 1960 as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC).

Cyprus was supposed to be governed under a bicommunal power sharing constitution but that only lasted three years. The constitution proved unworkable. The Greek Cypriots who were 80 per cent of the population felt that the Turkish Cypriots who were 18 per cent were given excessive privileges in the constitution and sought to amend it in 1963. The Turkish Cypriots refused to agree basic amendments to the constitution just three years into independence, and the bicommunal republic ceased to exist in that the Turkish Cypriot community took no further part in the government of RoC.

The break-up of the bicommunal RoC was protracted and messy and involved loss of life, land and property from 1963 onward although the two communities did not separate physically into two territories until the 1974 war.

With that kind of background you would think that negotiating for a bicommunal bizonal federation is a classic case of the triumph of hope over experience. Except that a flexible federation that involves compromise at inception and trial and error and constant compromise in practice are known to work even in challenging circumstances.

Factored into a federation in Cyprus would include adoption of the EU legal order across the whole of Cyprus as envisaged by protocol 10 of Cyprus’ accession treaty of 2004. As the EU itself is a partial federation, being part of the EU that operates by constant fudge and compromise would be very conducive to achieving the flexibility essential to the success of BBF.

For understandable reasons, the Greek Cypriots have not been as enamoured of federalism as the Turkish Cypriots have been over the years. This was natural between 1963-74 when they had full control of the RoC, as well as since then because people’s mindset takes time to adjust to division and displacement caused by war.

They have not been sure if Cyprus’ demography had changed definitively enough to justify agreeing to build a federal state based on the new demography – in my view the underlying reason why 75 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected BBF in the referendum of 2004.

The question many Greek Cypriots are asking after BBF’s stunning comeback in the “TRNC” is what does the RoC government do now? It was easy for RoC President Nikos Christodoulides to favour BBF when the Turkish side insisted on two states, but reality has now caught up with him; unlike Erhruman, he does not have a clear mandate to negotiate let alone agree to a BBF.

The political parties that backed Christodoulides’ election for the presidency do not support BBF and neither does the church. So what is he to do now that the Turkish Cypriot people have called the bluff?

I would not presume to advise either side on the complexities of substantive negotiations. But it is not presumptuous to say something about process that addresses the conundrum faced by Christodoulides. It is based on the principle that following the same procedure as previously is unlikely to yield a settlement.

Referendums are best used as forms of direct democracy to provide a mandate to political leaders rather than for the people ultimately to decide policy. Instead of embarking on detailed negotiations for a concluded agreement, the most rational way forward in light of past experience is for an outline BBF to be put to a referendum first before detailed negotiations for a final settlement begin in earnest.

In the event of an affirmative vote, negotiations could then proceed in earnest and at pace with the momentum for a solution much improved by the referendum result. 

The election of Tufan Erhrurman was great news, but to quote Churchill after victory in North Africa: Now is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. The end of the beginning indeed!

Alper Ali Riza is a king’s counsel in the UK and a retired part time judge