In a previous article, we examined the concentration of power and erosion of democracy in Cyprus. This article advances that discussion, focusing on the 2025 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit and its sobering verdict on Cyprus’s political and institutional health. The island remains a liberal democracy but is now classified as a ‘Flawed Democracy.’ This classification highlights a widening gap: Cyprus’s democratic ‘hardware’—electoral systems and legal rights—remains in place, yet its ‘software’—efficiency, transparency, and citizen trust essential for effective governance—lags behind. Cyprus is at an impasse: its party system is cartelised, and its democratic identity suffers from internal friction, further eroding democratic norms. Renewal is necessary, maybe by the entry of new parties in parliament, but not guaranteed.

The Anatomy of a Flawed Democracy 

In the EIU’s system, a flawed democracy means free, fair elections and respected civil liberties. However, governance is weak, political culture is stagnant, and participation is low. Cyprus scores 7.38 out of 10, ranking 40th globally, down from 37th in previous years. The country excels in the Election Process (9.17) and Civil Liberties (8.82), but its Functioning of Government score is only 5.36. In the EU, Cyprus ranks 22nd of 27, sharing the lowest governance score with Bulgaria. These figures show that Cyprus manages voting well but struggles with governance. 

The Governance Gap: A European Outlier 

The Functioning of the government pillar is fundamental in a democracy. Choosing a leader is one thing; running the country well is another. Government functioning highlights what happens after the election: policy implementation, transparency, and accountability. The contrast is clear: the government operates outside corruption, or it becomes part of it. A full democracy requires a competent, independent civil service free from political interference. Cyprus’s 5.36 score is an outlier in Europe; Nordic countries score above 9. This signals institutional inefficiency and public disillusionment, rooted in years of favouring political loyalty over technical skill. 

The Convergence of the Right: A Structural Failure of Pluralism 

A critical failure in Cypriot politics is the shrinking ideological gap between parties. Outside the traditionally distinct Left, the centre-left, centre, and right have fused into a single bloc, erasing policy contrasts. This ‘cartel party’ system trades ideology for executive power. The current administration exemplifies this: headed by a conservative DISY figure who rose through a partnership with the centre and centre-left. The coalition has since grown to include both DISY and the extreme-right ELAM, further blurring alternatives. 

This ‘grand convergence’ signals a political environment stripped of traditional checks and balances. When centre-right, centre-left, or even extreme right parties join or support the same executive, demand for distinct alternatives disappears. The electorate faces a superficial choice between identical governance, only the occupants of power change. The EIU flags these settings as high risk for democratic decay, alienating voters who see the political class as a closed shop. 

The Economics of Patronage: The Spoils of Corruption 

Limited political differentiation is fueled by patronage networks—the ‘spoils of corruption.’ Participation is driven by access to state resources, not policy. This clientelism (rousfeti’) allows all parties to retain influence by appointing loyalists. The EIU’s low ‘Political Culture’ score (6.88) shows weak democratic norms and a loyalty-first culture. 

By forging a broad ‘pro-government’ bloc with the extreme right, the administration destroys parliamentary scrutiny and violates previous norms. The ‘politics of the spoils’ hijacks government. Party survival trumps transparency and efficiency. Securing a majority eclipses democratic values and entrenches a ‘culture of impunity.’ The distribution of state assets and contracts now dominates steadily lowering Cyprus’s transparency indices. 

The Judicial and Executive Bottlenecks 

Political convergence deepens weaknesses, especially in judiciary. By 2026, Cyprus will still have one of the EU’s slowest judicial systems, making the ‘Rule of Law’ seem theoretical. In a patronage system, slow justice shields against scrutiny, enabling institutional stagnation and delaying corruption challenges indefinitely. 

The Attorney General’s dual role is a critical failure in executive accountability. It combines advisory and prosecutorial powers. Unlike systems where halting prosecutions is subject to judicial review, Cyprus has no such mechanism. This grants the executive legal immunity. Undifferentiated party blocs make it easy to distribute ‘spoils’ with little risk of prosecution. This is unlike democracies with strong checks and balances. The EIU cites this as a main reason Cyprus cannot become a Full Democracy. Without independent oversight, the government lacks the friction needed to prevent abuse of power. 

The Participation Malaise and the Crisis of Legitimacy 

Political cartelisation has led to a malaise of participation. When parties unite only to pursue state resources, voter apathy becomes rational. The EIU notes a growing gap between public expectations and government performance. High-achieving young Cypriots emigrate, seeing connections rewarded over merit. This brain drain weakens public administration.

The falling ‘Political Culture’ score reflects a legitimacy crisis. Barriers against extremism are weaker, and the centre-right and centre-left have changed roles. Instead of containing the extreme right, they normalise it to keep patronage. Disillusioned publics, disappointed by mainstream parties, either support ‘strongman’ leaders or bypass parliament. Including the extreme right in government support exemplifies this shift and indirectly validates anti-systemic rhetoric.

Conclusion: The Necessity of Radical Reform 

To progress from ‘Flawed Democracy’ to ‘Full Democracy,’ Cyprus needs structural, not elective, reform. The EIU report says Cyprus is a ‘theatre of democracy.’ Here, elections are just a spectacle, separated from real governance. Breaking this ‘glass ceiling’ means rejecting the politics of the spoils and demanding transparency and accountability without compromise. 

This requires urgent digitalisation of the courts to eliminate human involvement in administration, the formal separation of the Attorney General’s conflicting powers, and a decisive shift to merit-based public administration. Critically, the political class must abandon its cartelised unity, which ideological differences are ignored in pursuit of executive power, and restore real opposition. Cyprus must restore principled opposition to recreate necessary friction and stop state capture. If these contrasts are not established, Cyprus will remain in the ‘Flawed’ category—a country with the hardware of a modern state but the software of a previous era—facing increasing and irreparable isolation from the EU’s democratic core.